In recent years, much of the debate over the elephant has focused on the level of protection international law will extend to the species. The development of international law to protect the elephant, and the structure of CITES in particular, is examined in Part I of this Note. Part II describes the method that Zimbabwe and South Africa have used in attempts to preserve their elephant stocks and contrasts those schemes with the method used in Kenya. The Note then examines the results each country has achieved in recent years and suggests that the southern African active management programs have been more effective.
Numerous scholars have described multitudinous variations on commons problems. Part III applies the theoretical "commons" model to the elephant. This Part analogizes the elephant to marine and other natural resources and uses solutions to standard commons problems to explain the relative efficacy of Zimbabwe's active management policy for elephants. Part IV illustrates that a democratic government better fosters preservation of elephants through electoral incentives than does an undemocratic government. A democratic government is less likely to be corrupt than an undemocratic government, and so is less likely to allow poaching to continue. Despite similarities between South Africa's and Kenya's management programs, because South Africa's government has faced more electoral competition than Kenya's government, South Africa has avoided the adverse effects that corruption has had on Kenya's elephant population.
Part V addresses the results of other bans on trade in wildlife and draws parallels to the ban on trade in elephant products. In particular, the strict limitations on trade in leopard skins illustrate the possibility of a manageable system of limited trade in valuable animal parts. This Part concludes that limited trade in ivory could successfully be reopened, particularly in light of recent ivory identification processes.
I. THE TREATMENT OF THE ELEPHANT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The declining population of numerous species of wildlife in recent decades has drawn much international attention. To address this problem, several nations, including the United States, created CITES." CITES became effective on July 1, 1975, and has since been joined by at least 122 nations.' 2 The agreement's general purpose is to save plants and animals that are becoming extinct from overexploitation as a result of international trade. 3 of elephants as is affordable.
11. CITES, supra note 7.
12. See Cushman, supra note 6, at 44. 13. See CITES, supra note 7, pmbl.. 27 U.S.T. at 1090. 993 U.N.T.S. at 244
A. The Structure of CITES
CITES divides species into tiers of protection based on the degree to which they are threatened with extinction.' 4 A species may be listed in one of three appendices. Appendix I includes "all species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade."' 5 Appendix I comprises animals that require regulation in their trade to avoid becoming endangered.' 6 When a nation deems a species' survival within its own borders to be in jeopardy, it may enlist international cooperation by placing the species on Appendix IlY 1 The Convention requires different levels of protection by mandating trade restrictions for species in each of the appendices.' 8 In order to trade species listed in Appendix I, both the importing and exporting nations must issue a permit for a specific transaction.' 9 The permit signifies that both trading states have determined that the import or export is not "detrimental to the survival of the species involved. 20 The importing country must also determine that the specimen "is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.,, 2 1 Even trade that does not affect the survival of the species is often prohibited. For example, trade of hides from endangered animals that have died of natural causes is unlawful. 22 The overall goal is to subject species listed on Appendix I to "particularly strict regulation" 23 and thereby effectively eliminate trade in those animal products. Under Appendix 111, trade is restricted only with the country that has deemed its own population of a species to be endangered. FAVRE, supra note 8, at 140.
18. CITES, supra note 7, art. I, cl. b(i)-(ii), 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245 (defining "specimen" as any animal or plant, dead or alive, and any "recognizable part or derivative thereof"). This Note uses the term "trade in the species" to include all trade involving products made from the species, not just live specimens.
19. Id. art. Il, paras. 2-3, 27 U.S.T. at 1093-94, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246. 20. Id. 21. Id. art. II, para. 3, cl. c, 27 U.S.T. at 1094, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246. This does not prohibit all transactions that involve money. For example, a research institute might purchase a live specimen from another country, subject to the other requirements of CITES. FAVRE, supra note 8, at 82. Zoo purchases have presented a conundrum, because there is often a mixed purpose of scientific inquiry and profiteering from the exhibition of rare animals. To counter potential objections, some of the additional profits from the display of such animals, like the panda, may be used to further the survival of the species. Id. at 85-86.
22. The ban theoretically eliminates the incentive for humans to induce premature elephant deaths by failing to provide adequate habitat, or through other indirect methods. Advocates of the ban suggest that it would be difficult to distinguish between legitimate trade and illegitimate trade, and argue that to permit any trade would allow illegal trade to continue. BONNER, supra note 2, at 147. The complete commercial trade ban was implemented in part to counter anticipated political and economic pressure on governments that would jeopardize a partial ban. Favre, supra note 5, at 906-07. This problem might be cured by some form of marking system. See infra text accompanying notes 250-51, 255. 23. CITES, supra note 7, art. H, para. 1, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245. 24. Glennon, supra note 2, at 11. Appendix II provides a lower level of protection than Appendix I, allowing regulated commercial trade in the species listed therein. "5 To import a species, only an export permit from the exporting country's scientific authority is required. 26 Trade in Appendix II species is monitored by parties to CITES in order to ensure that sufficient numbers of a species remain in their habitat, and to decide if an Appendix I listing might be more appropriate. 7 Appendix 1H permits commercial trade in animals to continue. Species are listed in Appendix I or II through a vote of the signatory parties at one of the biannual conferences required by CITES? 28 The CITES treaty allows a country to take a reservation-or effectively to opt out of the listing of a particular species-either upon joining CITES* or when there is an amendment to the appendices concerning that species.' If a country takes a reservation, the country is exempted from the Convention for that species. 3 ' A reservation therefore allows a country to trade animal products freely with countries that either are not a party to CITES or have taken a reservation. 32 The initial intent of the reservation process was to protect domestic industries that relied upon the species. 33 The reservation process, however, created a loophole through which products of protected species can be "laundered." Some states with reservations receive the products and process them into final goods that are considered permissible for trade purposes. 3 4 Because the products must be a "readily recognizable part"" of the protected animal, trade in ivory, for example, is no longer prohibited once it has been carved. 36 In sum, use of the reservation process can limit the efficacy of an Appendix I ban. 25 36. FAVE, supra note 8, at 324; Glennon, supra note 2, at 12.
B. CITES and the Elephant
The African elephant was placed on Appendix II in 1977." 7 Subsequent population surveys in the late 1970's and early 1980's revealed the continuing drop in elephant populations. 38 The sustained decline led to the development of the Ivory Export Quota System (IEQS) at the 1985 CITES convention. 39 IEQS required each ivory-exporting state to determine the number of elephant tusks that it could export each year 40 and to mark each tusk with its country of origin and a unique code number. 4 ' The system created a database that would assist customs agents in determining which countries could legally export ivory within their quota. 42 The primary goal was to ensure that a country accepting ivory for import actually ascertained that a valid export permit had been granted for that ivory. 43 The theory of the IEQS was better than its practice. Because each country was permitted unilaterally to determine its quota, a country was not bound by any scientific or international estimates of the sustainable number of elephant culls. The quotas of some countries had no basis in reality. For example, Somalia set its 1986 quota at 17,000 tusks, despite an estimated elephant population of only 6000. Raymond Bonner explains that Somalia was actually planning to export tusks illegally taken in Kenya. 44 It was soon determined that the quota system was not achieving its goal, 45 and the international community recognized that further action was necessary to save the elephant.
In 1989, the CITES conference banned all trade in ivory by moving the African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I. Earlier that year, the United States and several European countries unilaterally had imposed sweeping bans on ivory imports, 4 50 The proposed amendment was passed over the opposition of the southern African countries, which nevertheless took reservations. Because no major ivory-purchasing nations took reservations there was no opportunity for significant legal sales to CITES signatories. 5 '
The 1992 CITES conference renewed the debate on Appendix I's terms. The group of countries favoring sustainable utilization, including Zimbabwe, attacked the complete ban and sought to allow countries with effective active wildlife management programs to sell elephant parts. 2 The group's proposal would require use of revenues earned from "beneficial use" of wildlife to provide additional money to "rural wildlife-producer communities," to "further invest in wildlife development," or to "provide income at a national level to developing countries. 53 The proposed changes were rejected. ' International efforts to protect the elephant have consisted of progressively tighter controls on the trade of its derivative products culminating in a total trade ban. These policies, however, have failed to eradicate either consumers' demand 5 5 for elephant products or the supply 5 6 of elephant ivory. Similarly, there have been few concerted international efforts to increase actual protection of the elephant by funding tighter antipoaching enforcement aimed at constraining ivory supply. 56. Supply, in this Note, means the supply of ivory and other elephant products, rather than the supply of live elephants. Thus, protecting elephants presumably increases the supply of elephants, while diminishing the supply of ivory and other elephant products.
57. The ban involves important national sovereignty issues. One author notes. "As many Africans see it, white people are making rules to protect animals that white people want to see in parks that white people visit." BONNER, supra note 2, at 85; see also John Waithaka, The Elephant Mlenace. WILDuFE CONSERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 62, 62 ("Government wildlife policies were instituted in such a way that people who had killed... wildlife products for income were treated as poachers. Local people, then. felt denied the use of resources that they considered to be theirs."). One estimate suggested that the ban amounted to a $50 million tax on African nations in the form of lost revenue from ivory. BONNER. supra note 2, at 142.
Michael Glennon has developed a theory of a global environmental right that allows all nations to expect that an endangered species will be preserved by the nation in which that species exists. Glennon. supra note 2, at 34-35. Glennon argues that his global environmental right gives rise to a corresponding [Vol. 104: 1473 I. THE TWO MANAGEMENT SCHEMES African countries must reconcile the tension between the incentives to preserve elephants and the incentives to reap value from dead elephants. Live elephants can generate tourism revenue" 8 and produce additional elephants. Substantial value can also be derived, however, from elephant products. Ivory was worth over $100 per pound in 1989," meaning that a single elephant could carry more than $1000-worth of ivory.6 Further, the hides and meat are valuable, 6 ' and a trophy hunt for an elephant commands a high price.
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Hunters' expenditures on such hunts far exceed the cost of the license required by the government, bringing additional money to an area. Elephant preservation, therefore, imposes substantial opportunity costs on a community. There are also real costs to retaining elephants. In Zimbabwe, elephants have been known to destroy crops and to kill people. 6 ' Elephants damage buildings, destroy water pipes, kill livestock,6 and are generally considered to be pests. 65 Kenya implemented its prohibition on the sale of elephant products prior to the international trade ban, but it generally emulates the CITES Appendix I stipulations. Kenya's method combines antipoaching patrols with a domestic trade ban in order to preserve and protect its elephants. Each scheme may be described generally as a management plan: Kenya manages the elephant population by prohibiting trade in elephant products, while Zimbabwe manages it by providing monetary incentives to local groups that actively help to protect the elephant population from poachers. Zimbabwe's plan is frequently termed sustainable utilization. Because Zimbabwe's approach contemplates active management of the elephant population, this Note refers to it as a "management strategy." The Kenyan system, which focuses on elephant protection, is referred to as a "protective strategy."
A. Active Management Strategies
Zimbabwe's management plan operates on the premise that "African wildlife, if it is to survive in the long run, must pay its way." 76 Before the Appendix I ban, the Zimbabwean government spent up to $15 million per year for all of its wildlife protection,7 7 using money generated by wildlife trade to pay for its protection. Since the elephant was switched to Appendix I, Zimbabwe has reduced its expenditures to $5.5 million. 78 International contributions, estimated at $500,000 per year, do not compensate for this shortfall in funding. 79 Zimbabwe's government is hard-pressed to increase funding, given the competing desires for health care and schools. 80 Because African and foreign governments and conservationist groups are unwilling or unable to pay for elephant preservation, Zimbabwe has maintained that it should be allowed to sell elephant products in order to fund elephant protection. It believes that revenue from tourism and the sale of elephant products would provide several million dollars that could be used for conservation efforts. 80. See BONNER, supra note 2, at 93 (describing how impoverishment of many African states precludes high expenditures necessary for adequate wildlife protection); Child, supra note 62, at 61 (rural family of eight has average income of $150).
81. BONNER, supra note 2, at 107 (noting that prior to ban, Zimbabwe's "thriving domestic carving industry" earned $2 million per year from sale of ivory gleaned from culls, and that some of this revenue [Vol. 104: 1473 In 1989, the Nyaminyami area of Zimbabwe earned enough from the sale of wildlife products (not just elephants) to support its conservation at a level well above the norm, 92 and to support its purchases of otherwise unaffordable social services. 93 Before the trade ban, residents earned profits from the sale of hides and ivory. 94 Since ivory sales are now banned, Zimbabwe has relied went into general treasury and ultimately to country's parks and conservation departunents); Child, supra note 62, at 61 (noting pre-ban income of $2 million, 40% from trophy elephants); Ricciuti. supra note I. at 26 (reporting that Zimbabwe earned over $13 million from elephant products in 1980's. two-thirds from ivory). Some local communities have S1.6 million (pre-ban prices) of stockpiled ivory Id. 85. BONNER, supra note 2. at 285. This is consistent with the common law doctnne of ratone Solt. which dictates that possession of animals is vested in the owner of the land on which they are found. dedicated to national wildlife protection.' e Individuals who sustain crop damage are still compensated, 1 0 ' and the meat from wildlife is sold at cost to local communities.' t 2 Local populations continue to receive "cash dividends from the proceeds of wildlife management"' ' 3 that give them an incentive to preserve elephants.
Zimbabwe's philosophy is also manifest in its acceptance of purely private wildlife ownership. For example, the Save Conservancy reserve, created by ranchers who have collectively fenced in their property, provides a refuge for animals driven from drought-stricken parts of the country.'"' The owners have set up antipoaching patrols and wildlife management programs, 0 5 having found that wildlife can be a more lucrative use of land (even with the ban) than livestock. The arid, harsh land does not support cattle stocks particularly well, but wildlife flourishes more readily, 1 ' 6 allowing the ranchers to earn money from tourism, including photographic safaris, and trophy hunting. 0 7 These earnings allow the ranchers to improve their antipoaching patrols and to receive more advanced scientific advice as to how many animals they may cull to preserve a sustainable population. ' Since the CITES ban on elephant products went into effect, the success of the program in Nyaminyami has declined. For example, fewer elephants were culled in 1990 than the regional management plan for that year deemed appropriate.'0 o Although sport hunting continues," 0 the local warden estimated that the inability to sell the tusks and hides cost the district $20,000 in the first eight months of the year."' This amount is equivalent to approximately 25% of the total income of the area." 2 The warden estimated that Nyaminyami would have earned $125,000 from the sale of ivory had the number of culls reached the number of elephants that the management determined could be killed." 3 This amount is roughly equivalent to the total that the Nyaminyami district receives in foreign aid for nutrition and primary education programs."' The effect of the CITES ban on elephant and ivory trade was to place a significant obstacle in the way of the achievement of Zimbabwe's preservation goal. The ban on ivory sales removed a vital source of funding," 5 and consequently Zimbabwe's ability to afford protection for the animals declined. Between the ban on ivory trade and internal political changes, the continuation of CAMPFIRE is unlikely." 6 Both before and after the ban, however, Zimbabwe's general policy has been to allow its people to share the profits wildlife can earn as compensation for the headaches it can cause. The policies provide incentives to communities to protect their wildlife because perpetuation of the elephant population allows them to earn money from tourism, while culling (prior to the CITES ban) and trophy hunting allow them to earn profits from elephants.
South Africa, like Zimbabwe, actively manages its wildlife to maximize its usefulness to the local population. Kruger National Park, the centerpiece of the South African game park system, is amply fenced to keep poachers out and animals in, and its antipoaching patrols are fully effective." 7 Like Zimbabwe's communities, the park profits from elephants. It pays for its operations through admissions fees and other tourist expenditures, and (prior to the CITES ban) through the sale of tusks and hides from culled elephants. Unlike Zimbabwe, ownership of wildlife is vested in the South African people through the government, rather than directly through local property rights.
Kruger has so successfully protected its elephants that park managers have culled elephants simply to ensure that the herds did not grow too large and decimate the vegetation."' Prior to the trade ban, South Africa could profit from its success in preserving the species by using funds from sales of elephant parts to provide improvements in the habitat for elephants as well as 111. BONNER, supra note 2, at 271. Only those elephants that were damaging crops and could not be chased away were actually killed. See also Ricciuti, supra note I. at 34 ('"We like wildlife more than before, but not 100 percent. They still kill people when crops are in the field. We have tusks[, I it would benefit us more if we could sell them."' (quoting local restdent)).
112. BONNER, supra note 2, at 271. other wildlife. The government also used these funds to improve the park for tourists. Now, however, the country may profit only from tourist revenues. The overriding aim of the southern African management programs is consistent with the goals of a CITES Appendix II animal listing: preservation of the species through close attention to its condition and habitat. Appendix II prohibits trade only when such trade is "incompatible with [the species'] survival."" ' 9 Zimbabwe and South Africa have made good-faith efforts to engage only in trade that does not interfere with their recognized responsibility to maintain elephant populations at a sustainable level,' and both countries have demonstrated that trade can, in fact, actually support preservation of the species. The number of elephants culled each year is determined by reasonable scientific estimates of what the habitat can support, rather than a shortsighted, profit-oriented approach.
B. Protective Strategies
Kenya's management plan bans all hunting and killing of elephants.1 2 1
Since 1978, Kenya has sought to protect all elephants, as well as other wildlife, from poachers. 2 The nation has chosen to focus on tourism as a means of earning revenue from the elephant-a reflection of an ideology that holds that people should profit from wildlife through its viewing value only.' 2 ' In 1989, the President of Kenya dramatized the country's commitment to this belief by setting fire to a pile of confiscated elephant tusks worth about $3 million, rather than selling the ivory to provide additional protection funds.
124
Kenya's antipoaching efforts in the 1980's were unsuccessful. Because Kenya had limited funds for conservation, the decline of the country's elephant population continued throughout the decade. The nation spent only a fraction 119. CITES, supra note 7, art. II, para. 2, cl. a, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245. 120. A plausible argument can be made that some legal sales of ivory help support the survival of the elephant elsewhere. A legal supply of ivory reduces pressure on other supplies, so that poaching elsewhere should diminish. Thus, legal ivory may undercut the market for poached ivory, given the additional costs of obtaining ivory through poaching. See Mary Cole, Hologram To Herald Resumption of Ivory Trade, New SCIENTIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 7, 7 (."The illegal trade has a monopoly on the market .... If legal trade was opened between, say, SACIM and Japan there would be no middle men and the cost of the end product would be lower, which would make the illegal trade uneconomic."' (quoting Rob Monro of the Zimbabwe Trust)); cf Killing a Giant for Its Teeth, supra note 59, at 8 (noting killing of hippopotamuses for their ivory teeth as substitute for elephant ivory).
121. 29 Entrance fees were lining the pockets of government workers, rather than being returned to pay for improvements to the parks or to the surrounding area.' 3 0 Until 1989, Kenya compensated farmers who lost crops to wildlife damage, thereby helping to reconcile the conflict between elephant preservation and human population needs. The farmlands from which elephants were feeding frequently were the poorest in Kenya,' thus making compensation even more necessary. In 1989, however, Kenya repealed the law providing compensation to farmers because the growing number of claims substantially exceeded the budgeted amount. 3 2 Fraud, consisting primarily of claims for unfarmed land, contributed to the demise of the program.'3 Kenya's policy of protecting elephants without profiting from them has thus led to two problems: an inability to fund adequately its antipoaching efforts, and the exclusion of human needs from the solution.
Kenya's protection program has improved over the last three years. A reorganization of its wildlife service has helped reduce corruption.'3 It has also instituted a stricter shoot-to-kill policy toward poachers.' 3 ' Furthermore, Kenya hopes to obtain $200 million in funding from other nations to improve elephant protection and tourist facilities.'" 6 These recent changes suggest that Kenya's strict protective approach may work, if properly organized and funded. Whether its success can be sustained over longer periods, especially if outside funding does not materialize, remains to be seen.
The Kenyan approach is essentially the same as that adopted by CITES for Appendix I species. The rule is that no elephant products may be sold because 125. BONNER, supra note 2, at 93 (reporting expenditures of S10/km". while suggesting that $200-400/km 2 is necessary 
1995]
any trade is believed to be per se detrimental to the species. There is no acknowledgment that limited trade may be consistent with the survival of the species, as is true of Appendix II animals. It is a bright-line rule: Trade is detrimental to the species and therefore banned.
C. Results of the Strategies
Elephant populations in Kenya have declined substantially during the 1980's. The population dropped during the decade from an estimated 65,000 to approximately 19,000.' 37 Other countries in eastern and central Africa, using policies resembling that used in Kenya, have had similar declines., 3 8 In contrast, Zimbabwe's elephant population has grown during the same period from 30,000 to at least 43,000.139 Botswana, using a management scheme like Zimbabwe's, has seen its elephant population double to 56,000 over the last decade. 40 Elephant populations have been increasing 5% annually in recent years in the countries using this type of active management approach.' 4 ' The southern African active management strategy thus appears to protect the elephant species more successfully than Kenya's protective strategy.
Because of the profitability of wildlife and the success of CAMPFIRE, the amount of land available for wildlife in Zimbabwe increased threefold between 1988 and 1993.42 In one area people abandoned their homes and created a more centralized settlement to allow more room for wildlife to flourish.' 43 Another community dug waterholes and provided food to maintain the elephant population during a drought.'" Thus, Zimbabwe's program has helped to reconcile human settlement with animal needs for habitat preservation in a way that redounds to wildlife's benefit. Kenya's program has not enjoyed nearly the same success. Zimbabwe's management strategy has also addressed the problem of insufficient funding for elephant protection more successfully than has Kenya's protective strategy. Zimbabwe's program helped replenish the government's coffers through the sale of ivory and other elephant products. Kenya's refusal to sell ivory meant that it did not benefit from these potential revenues. Thus, Zimbabwe's elephants generated more of their own protection money than did Kenya's because Zimbabwe sold ivory. These results suggest that Zimbabwe's active management program is the better method of preserving elephants.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE BANS, AND ELEPHANTS
Theoretical literature on property rights and the tragedy of the commons helps to explain why active management programs are likely to be more effective than protective programs in preserving the elephant species. A lack of defined property rights has long been recognized to lead to overuse of a resource.'
45 If no one person or entity has control of a resource, then individuals acting rationally will overconsume from the commons. The core problem is that any person who tries to conserve a resource by husbanding it today will see a competitor take the resource instead, leaving the conservationist with nothing tomorrow." 
A. Commons Problems
The commons examples most pertinent to the elephant come from natural resource economics. The commons problem of underground oil pools is well documented.
4 7 Common law applies the familiar rule of capture for migratory and fugitive resources to an oil field: Whoever pumps the oil first owns it.' Ownership rights attach only upon extraction, not discovery."
4 9
This common law rule typically leads each firm that owns land over an oil field to drill and drain the pool as quickly as possible. Each firm tends to overcapitalize in order to pump more quickly, and therefore they collectively dissipate any potential excess profits or rents"'o Overly rapid extraction, to capture the elephants before someone else does because the expected future value of the resource is zero. There is no incentive to invest in the future of the resource. Such a bias toward the present leads to the resource's depletion.
Although regions may reap tourism revenues from the elephant, an individual cannot realize an elephant's full value until the elephant is dead: Capturing the value of the resource requires slaughtering the elephant. 62 Just as no one is able to capture for herself the value of clams left on tidal flats, a hunter profits little, either from ivory or from tourism, when she leaves an elephant in the wild. Under a common property regime, one must kill an elephant and possess it in order to remove it from the commons and make it one's own.'
63 Elephants are consumed more quickly than is optimal from a societal standpoint because no one has an incentive to conserve elephants. In effect, an elephant left in the wild has a value of zero. All the incentives motivate hunters to kill elephants as quickly as possible.
B. Commons Solutions
Typical solutions to commons problems involve controls on the supply of or demand for the resource. Reductions in demand diminish the incentives to take the resource. Trade bans are intended to reduce overall demand, and thus to reduce the number of elephants that are killed. Demand can also be reduced through moral suasion. If everyone is convinced that ivory is useless (or has substitutes'64), or is morally wrong to own, demand will drop, and fewer elephants will be killed. The trick is to convince people of the evil ivory production entails. This method, in theory, works as well as reducing demand through market elimination.' 65 These methods do not always successfully reduce demand," however, and markets usually develop to meet any residual demand. 67 There will 162 . One study has noted that to sell ivory one must kill its "'factory." WOuTEt VAN always be some people who enjoy having something that very few others have, perhaps because it is rare or expensive. 168 Diverse cultural attitudes make a comprehensive elimination of ivory demand nearly impossible.1 69 As long as there remains a demand for ivory, there will remain incentives for someone to kill elephants to supply that demand.
Other possible solutions to commons problems involve controls on supply. In theory, a prohibition on ivory trade makes it more difficult for a person who kills an elephant to sell the ivory. This, in turn, will make a poacher less likely to incur the costs of obtaining the ivory. 70 Making a market illegal changes incentives. Providers of the illegal product incur the costs of evading law enforcement and may incur costs from confiscation of the product as well as penalties. These costs increase the overall cost of supplying the product, most likely increasing price and reducing the quantity traded.' Thus, diminishing the rewards of ivory acquisition through a ban should decrease such acquisitions, thereby sparing the elephant the blast from the poacher's assault rifle. Markets for illegal products, however, have ways of developing to meet demand, 72 so eliminating legal trade may be a fruitless attempt to eradicate trade in elephant tusks completely.
There are several typical methods of controlling supply to reduce the pressure on a common resource. Carol Rose identifies four general strategies for managing common resources: doing nothing; prohibiting new entrants from taking; prescribing methods by which the resource may be taken; and defining property rights.
73 Doing nothing to manage a common resource is what led to the need for action: Because poachers have been allowed to kill elephants wantonly, the elephant population has been decimated. Some affirmative 170. There are costs to killing elephants, including search costs, equipment costs, and processing costs. 171. There is a downside to making the market illegal. Two notable problems are that it limits opportunities to monitor the market, see SARAH FITZGERALD, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: WHOSE BUSINESS IS IT? 109 (1989) (noting trade ban on rhinoceros horn makes "tracking market routes difficult"), and that other forms of regulation are made impossible, cf STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993) 194-97 (arguing illegality of drugs leaves their safety completely unregulated). The inability to monitor is crucial for the purpose of ascertaining which countries are managing their elephant populations well. An inability to regulate the market means that there is no possibility of putting other constraints on the market. For example, a complete ban precludes the possibility of either a quota system or a taxation scheme. Taxing ivory might allow revenues to be returned to countries to help preserve elephants. Cf. Rose, supra note 165, at 36 (arguing that pollution taxes can be used for environmental improvements).
172. strategy is necessary to preserve a sustainable number of elephants. Preventing access of new hunters to the commons would be similarly ineffective; additional restrictions, such as a limit on the total number taken, would still be necessary. 74 Prescribing specific technologies for taking from the commons would be nearly impossible. Game wardens have found it difficult to identify poachers, and it would be no easier for them to certify whether a hunter was using the proper rifle. The remaining solution under Rose's model is a system of property rights. Assignment of some form of property rights has often been the preferred solution to commons problems. Each of the problems noted in Section A of Part III has been ameliorated through an allocation of "taking rights." A common solution to the problem of the shared oil field is unitization. This strategy gives the extraction rights to one company and then allocates the costs and revenues to each of the owners of the oil field.'" The alternative solution is to prorate the oil by assigning quotas and allowing oil withdrawal to be controlled by central agreement among the owners.'
76 Such solutions essentially vest a right in the oil prior to extraction, thereby eliminating the race to extract the oil that would have led to overcapitalization and wasted resources. Long-overfished fisheries have recently begun to implement quota systems to restrict fishing to sustainable levels. New Zealand has already created a system of transferable quotas for its fishermen,' and the United States has been contemplating implementation of such a program.'
8 An entitlement to a certain amount of fish reduces destructive competition because it eliminates the incentive to race to capture the resource. The quota "is, in effect, reserved for that fisherman."' 179 A quota allows fishermen to pursue a least-cost strategy 8 ' for collecting their fish, unencumbered by the seasonal, gear, size, and area restrictions previously employed to slow the depletion of the resource.
18
' The plan eliminates the inefficient restrictions imposed on fishermen to slow the taking of fish, and replaces them with a simple quota.
The surf clam problem has been ameliorated by the implementation of "quasi-property rights."' ' 82 This strategy involves first establishing a total quota on the number of harvestable clams. Next, the quota is divided and 84 The quotas provide incentives for fishermen to maximize the value of their harvest by taking only the most valuable clams, and thus the harvesting occurs at the "socially optimal age."' 85 Stable stocks of clams and reductions in the over-capitalization of the industry provide early evidence of the success of the system.' 86 The most important part of this plan is the setting of the overall quota: It is set so that clams are harvested at a sustainable level, and therefore eliminates the problem of resource depletion. 187 Another fruitful example of property-rights-based solutions to commons problems comes from the lobster industry. 88 In Maine, two systems of lobster allocation prevail. Both involve membership in a "harbor gang.' ' 89 The critical difference is how these gangs defend their areas. Gang areas are either nucleated, with rights strongest near the gang's own harbor; or perimeter-defended, with the gang holding exclusive rights to lobster within a certain area.'9 g Rights in a nucleated area are not necessarily exclusive. Nucleated areas may overlap, and on the margins members of different gangs may both set lobster traps.' 9 ' Perimeter-defended areas, in contrast, are lobstered exclusively by their gangs. t 2 The property right, therefore, is more exclusive in the perimeter-defended areas.
A comparison of the two territorial lobster allocation methods reveals the advantages of exclusivity in a private property regime. In perimeter-defended areas, capital investment is lower: Fewer boats per square mile are used.' 93 Likewise, lobstermen need to exert less effort for an equal catch.'" The lobsters caught are larger and hence more valuable.'" Thus the perimeterdefended system requires less investment and labor but yields a higher return than the nucleated system. These solutions to commons problems are similar in two respects. First, claims to resources are spread over time. That is, a person is guaranteed a specified claim on the resource now and in the future." 9 This overcomes the problem of the surf clam, because now a person can leave a clam on the flat and be assured that someone else will not take it. The resource's future value to the harvester is no longer zero. The second commonality is that takers are identifiable. The people clamming know who else is entitled to how many clams, and are able to enforce that limitation. Thus the right is not only extended over time but is also defensible.
C. The Programs Compared: Management Versus Protection
Southern African governments have attempted to enlist the virtues of property regimes in their policies. Zimbabwean wildlife policy creates a property right in wildlife. Rather than waiting until the elephant has been killed to recognize possession, the government has recognized that a property interest exists while the elephant is still alive. Thus a person who kills an elephant after she has a vested property right is no longer taking it from the commons, but rather is killing what is already hers. Because the property right protects her ability to profit from the elephant in the future, she has a greater incentive to protect it than the person who must kill the elephant immediately in order to profit.
Zimbabwe identifies the community as the owner of the elephants."" Because the community is entitled to exclude others from taking the elephants, it will be able to capture the elephants' value now or in the future. The property right allows the "owners" to determine which elephants it is advantageous to kill for profit and which elephants they should preserve for 196. As long as the user of a fishery is sure that he will have property rights over the fishery for a series of periods in the future. he can plan the use of the fishery in such a way as to maximize the present value (future net returns discounted to the present) of his enterprise. From the social point of view it can he said that he will bring about the "best" use of the fishery ..
Scott, supra note 146, at 122. This analysis assumes that owners of entitlements have confidence that the resource will not be depleted despite the presence of a property system. If people believe that elephants will disappear soon (because of poachers, say) then the owners will want to take their share as quickly as possible, before someone else does. People generally have an incentive not to respect property nghts until everyone abides by the property regime. For a discussion of this collective organization problem, see Carol M. Rose, breeding or other purposes.' 98 Either way, the community shares the proceeds. The community loses revenue only if it lets poachers steal the elephants. Community members can easily identify "owners" of the elephants because anyone not a member of the community does not have an elephant entitlement. The profit motive provides a strong incentive to prevent poaching, which is essentially stealing from the community. In these communities, as in the harbor gangs, no single person has rights to an elephant. A close-knit community controls access to the resource.' 99 This effectively creates central ownership and control. Because the communities generally share the wealth, there is little incentive or opportunity for individual appropriation."°T he local management programs create incentives to preserve the elephant population at a sustainable level. The Zimbabwean government provides scientific advice on the appropriate number of elephant culls and supervises to ensure that culls are not excessive. Zimbabwe focuses on guaranteeing the survival of a certain and substantial number of elephants. 20 ' By sharing profits from elephants with communities now and establishing community rights to them in the future, Zimbabwe has reduced incentives to kill elephants.
South Africa, like Zimbabwe, has chosen to manage wildlife actively and to use the proceeds to increase wildlife protection. 2 a Kruger National Park funds itself with revenues from admissions fees and from the proceeds of culling. The park's ability to profit directly from wildlife gives it an incentive to manage its wildlife carefully. South Africa's approach also effectively balances human and wildlife needs. Within the park, South Africa ensures that humans cannot encroach upon wildlife, 20 3 and the exclusion of human settlement means that no local populations are threatened by the wildlife." 4 South Africa and Zimbabwe recognize the competition between elephants and humans for land as well as the demands for the use of wildlife. Zimbabwe 198. If the elephant's "owner" has a future interest in the elephant, then that owner will consider not just the elephant's ivory, but also its ability to produce more elephants. In the extreme, farming of elephants solely for ivory and hides could occur. Assuming private ownership, only moral considerations would preclude such a system. There is debate as to the optimal harvesting time for an elephant's tusks. Tusks grow each year at an approximately constant rate, HARLAND, supra note 8, at 21, and thus are their largest upon the elephant's death, Glennon, supra note 2, at 9.
199. See Child, supra note 62, at 61 ("The [community management] process is democratic, and the opportunity for corruption is minimal because each member of the community is aware of who is responsible for which monies.").
200. Id. ("When an animal is shot or photographed, the fees are put on the table as cash and the community debates how to use it.").
201. The theory, as described by Zimbabwe's Rowan Martin, Director of Department of Parks and Wild Life Management, is to use the available funds to protect as much wildlife as possible and to leave the remaining wildlife to others. ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 4, at 171. Funding for wildlife protection could be increased if the ivory from culling could be sold.
202. See Perlez, supra note 40, at C4 (calling Kruger National Park "highly managed animal kingdom").
203. Id. 204. The park is amply fenced to keep animals in and poachers out. See id.
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[Vol. 104: 1473 relies upon a system of local management and property rights, while South Africa has implemented effective centralized park management. Each country has approached wildlife management from a similar perspective: They both realize that people are willing to pay to benefit from wildlife. By allowing groups in a position to control the resource to trade and to capture the profits, South Africa and Zimbabwe have provided incentives to maintain wildlife populations as well as to balance efficiently the clashing needs of wildlife and people. Kenya, in contrast to Zimbabwe and South Africa, has decided not to allow its people to share in profits from wildlife,0 5 as local populations may not profit from culling or hunting and generally receive very little of the tourist revenue.' Those most affected by the elephant's destructive capacity have few incentives to help keep the elephant alive. Furthermore, because trade in wildlife is prohibited in Kenya, there is no source of funding, other than direct government expenditures, to improve elephant protection. Kenya recognizes this fact, but is ideologically opposed to the culling of elephants to derive revenue.
2 0 7
D. Property Rights, Profits, and Protection
Rose posits that of the four regulatory mechanisms she describes, there is no best solution for all occasions. 2 0 8 As pressure on the resource increases, a more restrictive strategy will be more effective. The optimal regime is determined by comparing costs across these four possibilities. Rose shows that a property rights regime is preferable to a command-and-control regime once the cost of the latter type of policy becomes excessive.2°C ITES, like other command-and-control policies, imposes enforcement costs on those trying to protect the elephant. 210 In Kenya, all citizens bear a 205. In some sense this is a distributional issue. Kenya has allocated the property right in wildlife resources to its government. The government has outlawed all culling and determined that only the central government may earn money from tourism revenue. In a truly democratic nation with efficient administration and enforcement, this allocative choice would matter little. Individuals would "own-a share of the elephant resources, held in trust by the government, and would benefit from the profits. They would also be able to influence the government's trade policies.
206. See BONNER, supra note 2, at 136 (reporting little of tourist revenue in Kenya is returned to communities in form of better services and infrastructure).
207. restricts the possible methods to none: One cannot take the resource at all. CITES increases the cost of taking because one must run the risk of being caught with illegal goods or being killed by an antipoaching patrol. Raising taking costs reduces the quantity taken, but antipoaching patrols have not sufficiently raised the cost of ivory to sustain elephant populations.
portion of these enforcement costs. In southern Africa, owners incur the costs because they must protect their elephants to maintain their property rights. 2 "' Because southern African strategies have better-defined property rights, they encourage owners to reinvest funds earned from elephants back into 212 environmental protection. In Zimbabwe, the costs of protection are recouped through profits from trade. One who maintains a herd is rewarded with additional valuable elephants.
Zimbabwe and Kenya illustrate the lessons learned from the various commons problems. The typical outcome prior to property rights is an overuse of the resource: The commons becomes depleted. Once a form of property rights is instituted, owners know that they have a right to profit from the resource in the future, and they become more interested in conserving. They take less in the present because they know the resource will be there for them in the future. So too with elephants: The right to profits in the future encourages conservation in the present.
The effect of listing the elephant on CITES Appendix I is to eliminate the ability to profit from managed culling. From the individual's and community's perspectives, this is tantamount to returning the species to the global commons where one cannot profit by husbanding a resource. Because individuals will expect to receive few future profits from the elephant, the incentive to take from the commons still exists, diminished only by the additional costs imposed on poachers by enhanced enforcement of the ban. And enhanced enforcement may be unaffordable, given the loss of funds previously earned from elephant trade.
211. Kenya's total ban on the ivory trade may be viewed as an allocation of the property right to the government, which in turn denies citizens the right to kill elephants. The two schemes, then, differ in efficacy and management costs. Involving local populations in the patrols and giving them incentives to work for elephant preservation will likely reduce costs. This is intuitively plausible because local populations will not need to be paid if they are compensated for their efforts by appropriate incentives.
Dean Lueck notes that wildlife trade restrictions are often chosen as a response to the higher cost of property rights enforcement, but that as property rights become stronger and better enforced, trade can more safely be permitted. See Dean Lueck, The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 291, 319 (1989) . This has two implications for the elephant. First, a ban on trading (perhaps not universal, see infra text accompanying notes 250-55) may be useful as a transitional remedy until property rights are better defined and stabilized. If Kenya can develop a system like Zimbabwe's (with modifications to address local needs) then trade might be resumed. Second, where property rights have been well defined, open trade may be possible without the problems encountered in a system with ill-or under-defined property rights.
This explanation is insufficient to distinguish South Africa from Kenya, as both countries employ park wardens to defend elephants from poachers. Wardens have an incentive to take bribes and to allow poaching. This Note suggests in Part IV that corruption is less prevalent in South Africa than in Kenya because democratic processes are more likely to provide incentives to prevent such corruption.
212. Property rights in elephants allow the value of an elephant to accrue to the owner, and thus create incentives and resources to protect the entire species. Cf FAVRE, supra note 8, at 123 ("The net result (of a ban] would be that the illegal takers of elephants would receive all the profits while the protectors of elephants would receive no economic benefit."); Rose, supra note 165, at 36 (suggesting that sale of air pollution entitlements can raise money to enforce environmental regulations).
IV. ELEPHANTS AS A CORRUPTION PROBLEM
The Zimbabwean property rights system allows individuals to profit from careful conservation of the elephant, thereby aligning individual incentives with preservation of the species. Local property rights cannot, however, explain the success of the South African system. Both South Africa and Kenya rely on parks and wildlife agencies, rather than on the community and local property rights, to protect their elephants. Although their policies appear similar, South Africa has enjoyed great success in protecting its elephants while Kenya has not. Kenya's program has been burdened by significant corruption in the operation of its protection programs and antipoaching patrols, 2 " 3 a problem southern African countries have not had.
Park rangers have the same incentives for exploiting the commons as everyone else. This is as true in South Africa as in Kenya. Each warden will seek to collect her share of bribes before fellow rangers allow the last elephant to be killed. Absent enforcement, no one has an incentive to refuse a bribe and thereby to conserve the resource, because some other ranger will take the bribe instead. Insufficient supervision of park wardens or their superiors' unwillingness to enforce rules (because of bribes 21 4 or a lack of information) enables wardens to take bribes more easily. In such a regime, the allocation of the resource to the government becomes an allocation to the park rangers who reap most of the profits from wildlife, and thus the benefits of wildlife do not redound to the citizens of the nation. Absent a proper alignment of warden incentives with citizen preferences, a system to limit opportunities to bribe wardens will be necessary.
Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that competitive elections may reduce corruption in a political system. 1 5 The government of Kenya has been a dictatorship in recent years. The southern African countries, in contrast, do have at least nominally democratic political systems. 216 These political differences may affect incentives of wardens to protect elephants, and may therefore partially explain the successes of South Africa and the failures of Kenya.
Kenya South Africa, despite the exclusion of nonwhites from government until 1994, has had electoral competition in recent years. In 1987 the majority party received 52.7% of total votes, and in 1989, only 48.6%.223 Of the 166 seats in Parliament, the majority held 93 and the two opposition parties held a total of 72.24 The press is described as "extremely vigorous, ' '22 5 although it was subject to censorship while South Africa was in a state of emergency in the late 1980's.226 Although South African "democracy" has not, until recently, allowed nonwhites access to the political process, there generally has been more competition for power and a greater degree of media scrutiny of government in South Africa than in Kenya.
Dictatorships reduce government accountability to citizens. The lack of electoral competition often allows government officials to ignore public opinion. Officials in an undemocratic government may more easily seek to increase their wealth 227 at the expense of the nation's citizens. In Kenya, warden-agents fail to act on behalf of their citizen-principals because they are not held accountable by democratically elected officials. 22 Although the government of Kenya is supposedly managing national wildlife for the benefit of its citizens, its lack of accountability allows officials to pursue other goals, goals that may be detrimental to the survival of elephants. 22 9 In contrast, a government that has potential challengers is forced to address the desires of its citizens in order to remain in power. 230 Thus its officials will pursue a strategy that accords more closely with the preferences of its citizens. 23 ' South Africa's officials are more likely to manage elephants in the public interest because they have been challenged for reelection and are therefore more accountable to the desires of citizens.
Because Kenya's dictatorship allows corruption, and because corruption allows park rangers to act on their own behalf, Kenya's poaching problem has been exacerbated. 2 The gains from elephant killings are captured by park wardens instead of citizens. This stands in contrast to South Africa, where a more responsive government gives the electorate as a whole a say in how its elephant asset should be managed. Because democratic governments that tolerate corrupt rangers can be voted out of power, they have an incentive to prevent bribe taking in order to remain in power. 3 In South Africa, electoral competition aligns incentives so that the government returns the value of the elephant to the entire nation in the form of improved parks and abundant wildlife. Furthermore, South Africa, unlike Kenya, earned revenue from elephants by selling ivory and hides, thus increasing the total return, and thereby making even more important the fact that its system effectively returned the profits to the people. The South African system gives all citizens an incentive to preserve elephants because everyone stands to gain when elephants are saved from poachers. Because South Africa's government faces competition for reelection, it supervises its wardens more carefully than does Kenya. This reduces corruption and increases the wealth returned to citizens. Because South Africa allows culling and trade in elephants, the amount of money that it earns is significant enough to help protect elephants and to interest the population in the effective management of the resource. By allowing tangible benefits to accrue to citizens, South Africa reduces incentives for killing elephants inefficiently. Like Zimbabwe, the entire 232. A fully effective dictator would manage the natural resources well. Her incentives would be to maximize profits, like a private owner, by conserving elephants so that they will regenerate. This. of course, involves eliminating corruption within her government. The dictator's efforts to climinate inimical corruption probably would be stymied by high monitoring costs. See KIrTGAARD. supra note 229. at 70-71 ("The principal's problem grows difficult when ... he has poor information about the agent's activities. either productive or corrupt."); see also ROSE-ACKERUAN. supra note 214. at 198-99 (noting that unlike company stockholders, voter-citizens cannot sell their shares in the country); Edward C. Banficld. shareholder, the citizen cannot easily disassociate himself from a corrupt organization; to escape it he must incur the costs of moving to another city, state, or country.").
Monitoring costs include the direct costs of monitoring as well as costs to morale from signs of the principal's mistrust. Thus it is sometimes more costly to stop corruption than to allow it. Banfield. supra, at 590. A dictator may not use the resource efficiently for other reasons as well. If she fears being overthrown she may liquidate the resource quickly while it is still under her control.
233. Another method of curing this agency-corruption problem may be to privauze. In a pnvatized scheme, managers will seek to reduce corruption to the extent that it consists of taking (but not necessarily making) bribes. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 214. at 191. Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program creates a form of property rights in elephants, and in that sense privatizes the animals. Because the owners are the people who directly benefit from successful management, they will have greatly reduced incentives to take bribes. Roger Cohn, Zambia: The People's War on Poaching. AUDUBON. Mar.-Apr. 1994. at 70. 76 (reporting Zambian tribal chief and former poacher who changed his ways once he was given incentive to retain wildlife).
South African community has a stake in preservation because its members stand to profit. Kenyans, in contrast, can gain from elephants only by killing them illegally, and therefore have no incentives to provide protection.
V. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF OTHER BANS ON WILDLIFE TRADING
Part III argued that the CITES ban on ivory trade has prevented Zimbabwe, and other countries using active management policies, from realizing the full benefit of their wildlife policies. The trade ban forces Zimbabwe to forgo vital revenue that it could use to support its protection programs. This Part analyzes the ivory trade ban in light of other bans on wildlife trade. Both the rhinoceros and the leopard have been listed on Appendix I because of their rapidly diminishing numbers. The result of each ban has been quite different, however. The leopard population has stabilized, while the rhinoceros population has continued to plummet. The evidence from these other bans suggests that reliance on the Appendix I complete trade ban for the elephant's protection may be unnecessary or detrimental.
The black rhinoceros population declined from 60,000 in 1970 to an estimated 2000 in 1992. 2 34 The horn of the rhino is the prized item, used for dagger handles in Yemen and ground into medicinal products for consumption in China. 1 5 The price of hom was $13,000 per pound in 1988, and is thus considerably more valuable than ivory. 6 Despite the ban, rhinoceros horn has made it onto the black market and thus the poaching continues. 2 37 The official trade ban has frustrated active management policies like Zimbabwe's. One estimate suggests that the fee for hunting a single rhino could approach $100,000.'$ Such amounts would persuade locals to help protect rhinos from poachers if they had some stake in future profits, but the Appendix I listing eliminates local incentives to preserve the rhino. One rancher in Zimbabwe spends $22,500 to protect his seven rhinos each year. 39 He earns money from tourists, and could support his ranch's protection costs for over four years by allowing just one rhino to be hunted. The ban, however, significantly reduces the value of rhino "assets." Thus the Appendix I trade ban on rhino products has failed to stop poaching or to halt the decline in the rhinoceros population.
Michael Glennon contends, however, that a trade ban has been more effective in protecting the leopard. The leopard was listed on Appendix I to help stop the trade in its furs. Although it is unclear that the leopard was ever truly endangered, 2° the ban is credited with having sustained the population. 21 As a result of the initial success of the ban, the international community has reopened limited trade in leopard skins under a "special quota system" arranged through CiTES 4 2 Each country may export a selfdetermined quota, "based on the status of [its] particular leopard population[]." 2 " The skins may not be intended for resale and each importer is only allowed one skin per year, thereby limiting the development of a sizable commercial trade. 2 " The quota system requires tagging and numbering each skin, as well as annual reports to CITES. 4 5 This allows strict monitoring of the trade so that countries are less able to cheat on their obligation to protect.
The leopard trade system is a compromise designed to recognize that leopards are not equally endangered in all countries. 246 Because a trophy hunt for a single leopard can reap up to $10,000,247 the species provides a potentially lucrative source of funds for additional wildlife protection. The trade system allows countries with stable leopard populations to treat the leopard as a "renewable resource, '248 while other countries continue to provide the necessary protection for the species, assisted by strict international control of trade.
The leopard analogy is perhaps even more apposite than Glennon acknowledges. The trade system developed for the leopard acknowledges the differing needs and capabilities that various nations have for protecting wildlife. It rewards those that have protected the leopard, allowing them to profit from it, and to reinvest the funds in wildlife protection. Meanwhile, those countries in which the leopard is more threatened are able to rely on reasonably effective controls on trade to protect their leopards.
One significant distinction between the cases of the elephant, rhinoceros, and leopard is the ease with which the products are concealed during transportation. A rhino horn can be ground up, and is generally smaller than 240. FITZGERALD, supra note 171. at 45. The leopard population is "hotly debated." but one report estimates that it exceeds 70,000. Id.
241. See Glennon, supra note 2. at 26 n.219. An essential component of the leopard skin system is the strict monitoring of trade flows. Developments in technology will soon allow similar identification of elephant tusks to determine their geographical origin." Unfortunately, the cost may be high, perhaps $200 per tusk, and thus may not provide much help." A reduction in cost, however, would allow ivory from countries with stable elephant populations to be separated from those with declining populations. Such a system might allow a return to a form of regulated trade like the IEQS, which some contend was never given a real chance to work.5 2 In 1992, several southern African nations formed the Southern Africa Center for Ivory Marketing (SACIM).5 3 The idea was to create a realistic method of reopening trade in ivory on a limited, strictly regulated basis. SACIM requires that ivory be sold only to approved and registered carvers; that there will be no imports of raw ivory to SACIM countries; and that all profits go directly to elephant conservation.5 4 The critical component of SACIM is a plan to "tag" tusks with a hologram, bar code, and serial number5 ' 5 The combination of these policies would allow SACIM to guarantee that the ivory was taken only from countries whose elephant populations were thriving. It would therefore allow some countries to resume profiting, while enabling the countries with endangered elephant populations to continue their protection.
The success of the system for regulating the leopard trade suggests that it is possible to design a flexible international trade ban. The system recognizes that some countries are more successful than others at preserving the species, and rewards those countries with more effective preservation systems. It also supports the proposition that trade, if properly managed and monitored, will not necessarily lead to the extinction of a species. Instead such trade can benefit everyone: consumers, local populations, and most important, the species.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that a scheme of active management and property rights more effectively creates incentives to preserve a species than does a rigid ban on all trade in the species. The success of active management in southern Africa has resulted in the growth of elephant populations. By allowing local people to share in the profits from elephants, the active management systems give people a reason to protect the elephant. The policy has the effect of removing the elephant from the commons and allocating present and future rights to profit from it to the people. As numerous commentators have shown, similar solutions ameliorate the problem of overconsumption associated with other common resources.
International law, through CITES, has frustrated this goal by eliminating owners' incentives to protect elephants as their own property. The movement of the elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I has removed the legal ability to profit from elephants, and hence diminished the incentives to protect them. The change has forced all of Africa to adopt a protective system that has failed to protect elephants in the countries previously using it. The protective management system reduces citizens' incentive to preserve the elephant species because it reduces their ability to profit from it. Furthermore, corruption in Kenya keeps the few profits that are earned from tourism from being passed through to the average citizen.
Although active species management often involves culling, protective management coincides with an increase in the number of elephants killed by poachers. Culling is superior to illegal poaching because the money earned from the ivory assists other elephants, rather than lining poachers' pockets.2 If elephants must die-and ivory demand and expanding human populations have heretofore dictated that they will-active management ensures that their deaths will help to preserve the elephant species. If the CITES complete trade ban produces the same results as the trade ban in Kenya, local populations may 256. Culling may also be preferable because of its effects on the elephants themselves. A cull usually targets an entire herd, typically 30-40 elephants, thereby spanng individual elephants the trauma of experiencing the death of other elephants in the herd. See Ricctut. suipra note I. at 28 (If calves or females are knocked out of a population, the trauma suffered by the survivors disrupts their social structure and affects their ultimate survival. Poaching has had the same result. Elephants seem to experience distress when other elephants die and have been seen touching, even fondling, the remains."-. In contrast to culling. a poacher is likely to target only some elephants in each herd. while hitting many herds, leaving the young to suffer without their parents. A poacher earlier this century "was more ruthless and undiscrminating than the man hunting under license. He could not afford to be scrupulous about immature and cow elephants: any beast that carried ivory was his prey." WILSON & AYERsT. supra note 8. at 140 Similarly, today a poacher is unlikely to choose elephants whose loss will mean the least to the herd. but instead is likely to target only the oldest, tuskiest, male elephants whose ivory is most valuable. See HARLAND. supra note 8. at 21-22. Scientifically managed culling reduces this problem by allowing a proper age and sex disibution to be maintained. See Karen Barnes & Richard Barnes. A Lost Generation. WILDUFE CONSERVATION. Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 70, 71 (noting negative future effects of poaching's decimation of specific age group of elephants).
